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Abstract:
The problem of designing an optimal weighted voting system for the two-
tier voting, applicable in the case of the Council of Ministers of the European
Union (EU), is investigated. Various arguments in favor of the square root
voting system, where the voting weights of member states are proportional
to the square root of their population are discussed and a link between this
solution and the random walk in the one-dimensional lattice is established. It is
known that the voting power of every member state is approximately equal to
its voting weight, if the threshold q for the qualified majority in the voting body
is optimally chosen. We analyze the square root voting system for a generic
‘union’ of M states and derive in this case an explicit approximate formula for
the level of the optimal threshold: q ≃ 1/2 + 1/
√
piM . The prefactor 1/
√
pi
appears here as a result of averaging over the ensemble of ‘unions’ with random
populations.
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1 Introduction
Recent political debate on the voting system used in the Council of Ministers
of the European Union stimulated research in the theory of indirect voting, see
e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The double majority voting system, adopted for the Council
by The Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007 is based on two criteria: ‘per capita’
and ‘per state’. This system apparently reflects the principles of equality of
Member States and that of equality of citizens. However, as recently analyzed
by various authors [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 13, 15, 16], in such a system the large
states gain a lot of power from the direct link to population, while the smallest
states derive disproportionate power from the other criterion. The combined
effect saps influence away from all medium-sized countries. Ironically, a similar
conclusion follows from a book by Lionel Penrose, who wrote already in 1952
[17]:
If two votings were required for every decision, one on a per capita basis and
the other upon the basis of a single vote for each country, this system would be
inaccurate in that it would tend to favor large countries.
To quantify the notion of voting power, mathematicians introduced the con-
cept of power index of a member of the voting body, which measures the proba-
bility that his vote will be decisive in a hypothetical ballot: Should this member
decide to change his vote, the winning coalition would fail to satisfy the qual-
ified majority condition. Without any further information about the voting
body it is natural to assume that all potential coalitions are equally likely. This
very assumption leads to the concept of Banzhaf(-Penrose) index called so after
John Banzhaf, an American attorney, who introduced this index independently
in 1965 [18].
Note that this approach is purely normative, not descriptive: we are in-
terested in the potential voting power arising from the voting procedure itself.
Calculation of the voting power based on the counting of majority coalitions
is applicable while analyzing institutions in which alliances are not permanent,
but change depending upon the nature of the matter under consideration.
To design a representative voting system, i.e. the system based on the demo-
cratic principle, that the vote of any citizen of any Member State is of equal
worth, one needs to use a weighted voting system. Consider elections of the
government in a state with population of size N . It is easy to imagine that an
average German citizen has smaller influence on the election of his government
than, for example, a citizen of the neighboring Luxembourg. Analyzing this
problem in the context of voting in the United Nations just after the World
War II Penrose showed, under some natural assumptions, that in such elections
the voting power of a single citizen decays as one over square root of N . Thus,
the system of indirect voting applied to the Council is representative, if the vot-
ing power of each country is proportional to the square root of N , so that both
factors cancel out. This statement is known in the literature under the name of
the Penrose square root law [19, 20]. It implies that the voting power of each
member of the EU Council should behave as
√
N and such voting systems have
been analyzed in this context by several experts since late 90s [21, 22].
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It is challenging to explain this fact in a way accessible to a wide audience
[23, 24, 25, 26]. A slightly paradoxical nonlinearity in the result of Penrose is
due to the fact that voting in the Council should be considered as a two–tier
voting system: Each member state elects a government, which delegates its
representative to the Council. Any representative has to say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on
behalf of his state in every voting organized in the Council. The key point is
that in such a voting each member of the Council cannot split his vote. Making
an idealistic assumption that the vote of a Minster in the Council represents
the will of the majority of the citizens of the state he represents, his vote ‘Yes’
means only that a majority of the population of his state supports this decision,
but does not reflect the presence of a minority.
Consider an exemplary issue to be voted in the Council and assume that
the preferences of the voters in each state are known. Assume hypothetically
that a majority of population of Malta says ‘Yes’ on a certain issue, the votes
in Italy split as 30 millions ‘Yes’ and 29 millions ‘No’, while all 43 millions of
citizens of Spain say ‘No’. A member of the Council from Malta follows the will
of the majority in his state and votes ‘Yes’. So does the representative of Italy.
According to the double majority voting system his vote is counted on behalf
of the total number of 59 millions of the population of Italy. Thus these voting
rules allow 30 millions of voters in Italy to over-vote not only the minority of 29
millions in their state (which is fine), but also, with the help of less than half a
million of people from Malta, to over–vote 43 millions of Spaniards.
This pedagogical example allows one to conclude that the double majority
voting system would work perfectly, if all voters in each member state had
the same opinion on every issue. Obviously such an assumption is not realistic,
especially in the case of the European states, in which the citizens can nowadays
afford the luxury of an independent point of view. In general, if a member of the
Council votes ‘Yes’ on a certain issue, in an ideal case one may assume that the
number of the citizens of his state which support this decision varies from 50%
till 100% of the total population. In practice, no concrete numbers for each state
are known, so to estimate the total number of European citizens supporting a
given decision of the Council one has to rely on statistical reasoning.
To construct the voting system in the Council with voting powers propor-
tional to the square root of populations one can consider the situation, where
voting weights are proportional to the square root of populations and the Coun-
cil takes its decision according to the principle of a qualified majority. In other
words, the voting in the Council yields acceptance, if the sum of the voting
weights of all Ministers voting ‘Yes’ exceeds a fixed quota q, set for the qualified
majority. From this perspective the quota q can be treated as a free parame-
ter [27, 28], which may be optimized in such a way that the mean discrepancy
∆ between the voting power (measured by the Banzhaf index) and the voting
weight of each member state is minimal.
In the case of the population in the EU consisting of 25 member states it
was shown [29, 23] that the value of the optimal quota q∗ for qualified majority
in the Penrose’s square root system is equal to 62.0%, while for EU-27 this
number drops down to 61.5% [8, 30]. Furthermore, the optimal quota can be
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called critical, since in this case the mean discrepancy ∆(q∗) is very close to zero
and thus the voting power of every citizen in each member state of the Union is
practically equal. This simple scheme of voting in the EU Council based on the
square root law of Penrose supplemented by a rule setting the optimal quota to
q∗ happens to give larger voting powers to the largest EU than the Treaty of
Nice, but smaller ones than the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore this voting system
has been dubbed by the media as the Jagiellonian Compromise.
It is known that the existence of the critical quota q∗, is not restricted to the
particular distribution of the population in the European Union, but it is also
characteristic of a generic distribution of the population [29, 31, 8]. The value
of the critical quota depends on the particular distribution of the population in
the ‘union’, but even more importantly, it varies considerably with the number
M of member states. An explicit approximate formula for the critical quota
was derived in [30]. It is valid in the case of a relatively large number of the
members of the ‘union’ and in the asymptotic limit, M →∞, the critical quota
tends to 50%, in consistence with the so-called Penrose limit theorem [32].
On one hand it is straightforward to apply this explicit formula for the
current population of all member states of the existing European Union, as
well as to take into account various possible scenarios of a possible extension
of the Union. On the other hand, if the number of member states is fixed,
while their populations vary in time, continuous update of the optimal value
for the qualified majority may be cumbersome and unpractical. Hence one may
try to neglect the dependence on the particular distribution of the population
by selecting for the quota the mean value of 〈q〉, where the average is taken
over a sample of random population distributions, distributed uniformly in the
allowed space of M -point probability distributions. In this work we perform
such a task and derive an explicit, though approximate, formula for the average
critical quota.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 devoted to the one-tier voting
system, we recall the definition of Banzhaf index and review the Penrose square
root law. In section 3, which concerns the two-tier voting systems, we describe
the square root voting system and analyze the average number of misrepresented
voters. Section 4 is devoted to the problem of finding the optimal quota for the
qualified majority. It contains the key result of this paper: derivation of a simple
approximate formula for the average optimal quota, which depends only on the
number M of the member states and is obtained by averaging over an ensemble
of random distributions of the population of the ‘union’.
2 One tier voting
Consider a voting body consisting of M voters voting according to the qualified
majority rule. Assume that the weights of the votes need not to be equal, which
is typical e.g. in the case of an assembly of stockholders of a company: the
weight of the vote of a stockholder depends on the number of shares he or she
possesses. It is worth to stress that, generally, the voting weights do not directly
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give the voting power.
To quantify the a priori voting power of any member of a given voting
body game theorists introduced the notion of a power index. It measures the
probability that a member’s vote will be decisive in a hypothetical ballot: should
this player decide to change its vote, the winning coalition would fail to satisfy
the qualified majority condition. In the game theory approach to voting such a
player is called pivotal.
The assumption that all potential coalitions of voters are equally likely leads
to the concept of the Banzhaf index [19, 18]. To compute this power index for a
concrete case one needs to enumerate all possible coalitions, identify all winning
coalitions, and for each player find the number of cases in which his vote is
decisive.
Let M denote the number of voters and ω the total number of all win-
ning coalitions, that satisfy the qualified majority condition. Assume that ωk
denotes the number of winning coalitions that include the k-th player; where
k = 1, . . . ,M . Then the Banzhaf index of the k–th voter reads
ψk :=
ωk − (ω − ωk)
2M−1
=
2ωk − ω
2M−1
. (1)
To compare these indices for decision bodies consisting of different number of
players, it is convenient to define the normalized Banzhaf (-Penrose) index:
βk :=
ψk∑M
i=1 ψi
(2)
such that
∑M
i=1 βi = 1.
In the case of a small voting body such a calculation is straightforward, while
for a larger number of voters one has to use a suitable computer program.
2.1 Square root law of Penrose
Consider now the case of N members of the voting body, each given a single
vote. Assume that the body votes according to the standard majority rule. On
one hand, since the weights of each voter are equal, so must be their voting
powers. On the other hand, we may ask, what happens if the size N of the
voting body changes, for instance, if the number of eligible voters gets doubled,
how does this fact influence the voting power of each voter?
For simplicity assume for a while that the number of voters is odd, N =
2j + 1. Following original arguments of Penrose we conclude that a given voter
will be able to effectively influence the outcome of the voting only if the votes
split half and half: If the vote of j players would be ‘Yes’ while the remaining
j players vote ‘No’, the role of the voter we analyze will be decisive.
Basing upon the assumption that all coalitions are equally likely one can
ask, how often such a case will occur? In mathematical language the model in
which this assumption is satisfied is equivalent to the Bernoulli scheme. The
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probability that out of 2j independent trials we obtain k successes reads
Pk :=
(
2j
k
)
pk(1− p)2j−k , (3)
where p denotes the probability of success in each event. In the simplest sym-
metric case we set p = 1− p = 1/2 and obtain
Pj =
(
1
2
)2j
(2j)!
(j!)2
. (4)
For large N we may use the Stirling approximation for the factorial and obtain
the probability ψ that the vote of a given voter is decisive
ψ = Pj ∼ 2−2j (2j/e)
2j
√
4pij
[(j/e)j
√
2pij]2
=
1√
pij
∼
√
2
piN
. (5)
For N even we get the same approximation. In this way one can show that
the voting power of any member of the voting body depends on its size as
1/
√
N , which is the Penrose square root law. The above result is obtained
under the assumption that the votes of all citizens are uncorrelated. A sound
mathematical investigation of the influence of possible correlations between the
voting behavior of individual citizens for their voting power has been recently
presented by Kirsch [33]. It is easy to see that due to strong correlations certain
deviations from the square root law have to occur, since in the limiting case
of unanimous voting in each state (perfect correlations), the voting power of a
single citizen from a state with population N will be inversely proportional to
N .
The issue that the assumptions leading to the Penrose law are not exactly
satisfied in reality was raised many times in the literature, see, e.g. [34, 35],
also in the context of the voting in the Council of the European Union [36].
However, it seems not to be easy to design a rival model voting system which
correctly takes into account the essential correlations, varying from case to case
and evolving in time. Furthermore, it was argued [33] that the strength of the
correlations between the voters tend to decrease in time. Thus, if one is to
design a voting system to be used in the future in the Council of the European
Union, it is reasonable to consider the idealistic case of no correlations between
individual voters. We will follow this strategy and in the sequel rely on the
square root law of Penrose.
2.2 Pivotal voter and the return probability in a random
walk
It is worth to emphasize that the square root function appearing in the above
derivation is typical to several other reasonings in mathematics, statistics and
physics. For instance, in the analyzed case of a large voting body, the probability
distribution Pk in the Bernoulli scheme can be approximated by the Gaussian
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distribution with the standard deviation being proportional to 1/
√
N . It is
also instructive to compare the above voting problem with a simple model of a
random walk on the one dimensional lattice.
Assume that a particle subject to external influences in each step jumps a
unit distance left or right with probability one half. What is the probability
that it returns to the initial position after N steps? It is easy to see that the
probability scales as 1/
√
N , since the answer is provided by exactly the same
reasoning as for the Penrose law.
Consider an ensemble of particles localized initially at the zero point and
performing such a random walk on the lattice. If the position of a particle at
time n differs from zero, in half of all cases it will jump towards zero, while in
the remaining half of cases it will move in the opposite direction. Hence the
mean distance 〈D〉 of the particle from zero will not change. On the other hand,
if at time n the particle happened to return to the initial position, in the next
step it would certainly jump away from it, so the mean distance from zero would
increase by one.
To compute the mean distance form zero for an ensemble of random particles
performing N steps, we need to sum over all the cases, when the particle returns
to the initial point. Making use of the previous result, that the return probability
P (n) at time n behaves as 1/
√
n, we infer that during the time N the mean
distance behaves as
〈D(N)〉 ≈
N∑
n=1
P (n) ≈
N∑
n=1
1√
n
∼
√
N . (6)
This is just one formulation of the diffusion law. As shown, the square root of
Penrose is closely related with some well known results from mathematics and
physics, including the Gaussian approximation of binomial distribution and the
diffusion law.
3 Two tier voting
In a two-tier voting system each voter has the right to elect his representative,
who votes on his behalf in the upper chamber. The key assumption is that, on
one hand, he should represent the will of the population of his state as best he
can, but, on the other hand, he is obliged to vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in each ballot
and cannot split his vote. This is just the case of voting in the Council of the
EU, since citizens in each member state choose their government, which sends
its Minister to represent the entire state in the Council.
These days one uses in the Council the triple majority system adopted in
2001 in the Treaty of Nice. The Treaty assigned to each state a certain number
of ‘weights’, distributed in an ad hoc fashion. The decision of the Council is
taken if the coalition voting in favour of it satisfies three conditions:
a) it is formed by the standard majority of the member states,
b) states forming the coalition represent more then 62% of the entire popu-
lation of the Union,
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c) the total number of weights of the ‘Yes’ votes exceeds a quota equal to
approximately 73.9% of all weights.
Although all three requirements have to be fulfilled simultaneously, detailed
analysis shows that condition c) plays a decisive role in this case: if it is satisfied,
the two others will be satisfied with a great likelihood as well [1, 2].
Therefore, the voting weights in the Nice system play a crucial role. However,
the experts agree [1, 4] that the choice of the weights adopted is far from being
optimal. For instance the voting power of some states (including e.g. Germany
and Romania) is significantly smaller than in the square root system. This
observation is consistent with the fact that Germany was directly interested to
abandon the Nice system and push toward another solution that would shift the
balance of power in favor of the largest states.
In the double majority voting system, adopted in December 2007 in Lisbon,
one gave up the voting weights used to specify the requirement c) and decided
to preserve the remaining two conditions with modified majority quotas. A
coalition is winning if:
a’) it is formed by at least 55% of the members states,
b’) it represents at least 65% of the population of the Union.
Additionally, every coalition consisting of all but three (or less) countries is
winning even if it represents less than 65% of the population of the Union.
The double majority system will be used in the Council starting from the
year 2014. However, a detailed analysis by Moberg [14] shows that in this
concrete case the ‘double majority’ system is not really double, as the per capita
criterion b’) plays the dominant role here. In comparison with the Treaty of
Nice, the voting power index will increase for the four largest states of the Union
(Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy) and also for the smallest
states. To understand this effect we shall analyze the voting system in which
the voting weight of a given state is directly proportional to its population.
3.1 Voting systems with per capita criterion
The idea ‘one citizen – one vote’ looks so natural and appealing, that in several
political debates one often did not care to analyze in detail its assumptions
and all its consequences. It is somehow obvious that a minister representing a
larger (if population is considered) state should have a larger weight during each
voting in the EU Council. On the other hand, one needs to examine whether
the voting weights of a minister in the Council should be proportional to the
population he represents. It is clear that this would be very much the case, if
one could assume that all citizens in each member state share the very same
opinion in each case.
However, this assumption is obviously false, and nowadays we enjoy in Eu-
rope the freedom to express various opinions on every issue. Let us then for-
mulate the question, how many citizens from his state each minister actually
represents in an exemplary voting in the Council? Or to be more precise, how
many voters from a given state with population N share in a certain case the
opinion of their representative? We do not know!
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Under the idealizing assumption that the minister always votes according to
the will of the majority of citizens in his state, the answer can vary from N/2 to
N . Therefore, the difference between the number of the citizens supporting the
vote of their minister and the number of those who are against it can vary from
0 to N . In fact it will vary from case to case in this range, so an assumption
that it is always proportional to N is false. This crucial issue, often overlooked
in popular debates, causes problems with representativeness of a voting system
based on the ‘per capita’ criterion.
There is no better way to tackle the problem as to rely on certain statistical
assumptions and estimate the average number of ‘satisfied citizens’. As such
an analysis is performed later in this paper, we shall review here various argu-
ments showing that a system with voting weights directly proportional to the
population is advantageous to the largest states of the union.
Consider first a realistic example of a union of nine states: a large state A,
with 80 millions of citizens and eight small states from B to I, with 10 millions
each. Assume now that in a certain case the distribution of the opinion in
the entire union is exactly polarized: in each state approximately 50% of the
population support the vote ‘Yes’, while the other half is against. Assume now
that the government of the large state is in position to establish exactly the will
of the majority of citizens in their state (say it is the vote ‘Yes’) and order its
minister to vote accordingly. Thus the vote of this minister in the council will
then be counted as a vote of 80 millions of citizens.
On the other hand, in the remaining states the probability that the majority
of citizens support ‘Yes’ is close to 50%. Hence it is most likely that the votes
of the ministers from the smaller states split as 4 : 4. Other outcomes: 5 : 3,
6 : 2, or 7 : 1 are less probable, but all of them result in the majority of the
representative of the large state A. The outcome 8 : 0 is much less likely, so
if we sum the votes of all nine ministers we see that the vote of the minister
from the largest state will be decisive. Hence we have shown that the voting
power of all citizens of the nine small states is negligible, and the decision for
this model union is practically taken by the half of its population belonging
to the largest state A. Even though in this example we concentrated on the
‘per capita’ criterion and did not take into account the other criterion, it is not
difficult to come up with analogous examples which show that the largest states
are privileged also in the double majority system. Similarly, the smallest states
of the union benefit from the ‘per state’ criterion.
Let us have a look at the position of the minority in large states. In the above
example the minority in the 80 million state can be as large as 40 million citizens,
but their opinion will not influence the outcome of the voting, independently of
the polarization of opinion in the remaining eight states. Thus one may conclude
that in the voting system based on the ‘per capita’ criterion, the influence of the
politicians representing the majority in a large state is enhanced at the expense
of the minority in this state and the politicians representing the smaller states.
Last but not least, let us compare the maximal sizes of the minority, which
can arise during any voting in an EU member state. In Luxembourg, with its
population of about 400 000 people, the minority cannot exceed 200 000 citizens.
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On the other hand, in Germany, which is a much larger country, it is possible
that the minority exceeds 41 millions of citizens, since the total population
exceeds 82 millions. It is then fair to say, that, due to elections in smaller
states, we know the opinion of citizens in these states with a better accuracy,
than in larger members of the union. Thus, as in smaller states the number
of misrepresented citizens is smaller, their votes in the EU Council should be
weighted by larger weights than the vote of the largest states. This very idea is
realized in the weighted voting system advocated by Penrose.
3.2 Square root voting system of Penrose
The Penrose system for the two-tier voting is based on the square root law re-
viewed in Sec. 2.1. Since the voting power of a citizen in state k with population
Nk scales as 1/
√
Nk, this factor will be compensated, if the voting power of each
representative in the upper chamber will behave as
√
Nk. Only in this way the
voting power of each citizen in every state of a union consisting ofM states will
be equal.
Although we know that the voting power of a minister in the Council needs
not coincide with the weight of his vote, as a rough approximation let us put
his weights wk proportional to the square root of the population he represents,
that is wk =
√
Nk/
∑M
i=1
√
Ni.
To see a possible impact of the change of the weights let us now return to
the previous example of a union of one big state and eight small ones. As the
state A is 8 times as large as each of the remaining states, its weight in the
Penrose system will be wA =
√
8wB . As
√
8 exceeds 2 and is smaller then 3, we
see that accepting the Penrose system will increase the role of the minority in
the large state and the voting power of all smaller states. For instance, if the
large state votes ‘Yes’ and the votes in the eight states split as 2 : 6 or 1 : 7
in favor for ‘No’, the decision will not be taken by the council, in contrast to
the simple system with one ‘per capita’ criterion. There, we have assumed that
the standard majority of weights is sufficient to form a winning coalition. If the
threshold for the qualified majority is increased to 54%, also the outcome 3 : 5
in favor for ‘No’ in the smaller states suffices to block the decision taken in the
large state.
This simple example shows that varying the quota for the qualified majority
considerably influences the voting power, see also [27, 28]. The issue of the se-
lection of the optimal quota will be analyzed in detail in the subsequent section.
At this point, it is sufficient to add that in general it is possible to find such a
level of the quota for which the voting power βk of the k-th state is proportional
to
√
Nk and, in consequence, the Penrose law is almost exactly fulfilled [29, 8].
Applying the square root voting system of Penrose combined with the opti-
mal quota to the problem of the Council, one obtains a fair solution, in which
every citizen in each member state of the Union has the same voting power,
hence the same influence on the decisions taken by the Council. In this case,
the voting power of each European state measured by the Banzhaf index scales
as the square root of its population. This weighted voting system happens to
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give a larger voting power to the largest EU states (including Germany) than the
Treaty of Nice but smaller than the double majority system. On the other hand,
this system is more favorable to all middle size states then the double majority,
so it is fair to consider it as a compromise solution. The square root voting
system of Penrose is simple (one criterion only), transparent and efficient – the
probability of forming a winning coalition is reasonably high. Furthermore, as
discussed later, it can be easily adopted to any possible extension of the Union.
3.3 The second square root law of Morris
To provide an additional argument in favour of the square root weights of Pen-
rose [37], consider a model state of N citizens, of which a certain number k
support a given legislation to be voted in the council. Assume that the repre-
sentative of this state knows the opinion of his people and, according to the will
of the majority, he votes ‘Yes’ in the council if k ≥ N/2. Then the number of cit-
izens satisfied with his decision is k. The number N −k of disappointed citizens
compensates the same number of yes–votes, so the vote of the minister should
effectively represent the difference between them, w = k−(N−k) = 2k−N . By
our assumption concerning the majority this number is positive, but in general
the effective weight of the vote of the representative should be w = |2k −N |.
Assume now that the votes of any of N citizens of the state are independent,
and that both decisions are equally likely, so that p = 1−p = 1/2. Thus, for the
statistical analysis, we can use the Bernoulli scheme (3) and estimate the weight
of the vote of the minister by the average using the Stirling approximation:
〈wN 〉 =
N∑
k=0
Pk|2k −N | =
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
1
2N
|2k −N |
=
⌊N/2⌋+ 1
2N−1
(
N
⌊N/2⌋+ 1
)
∼
√
2N
pi
. (7)
Here ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer not greater than x. This result provides
another argument in favor of the weighted voting system of Penrose: Counting
all citizens of a given state, we would attribute the weights of the representative
proportionally to the population N he is supposed to represent. On the other
hand, if we take into account the obvious fact that not all citizens in this state
share the opinion of the government on a concrete issue and consider the average
number of the majority of citizens which support his decision one should weight
his vote proportionally to
√
N . From this fact one can deduce the second square
root law of Morriss [38, 20, 37, 36] that states that the average number of
misrepresented voters in the union is smallest if the weights are proportional
to the square root of the population and quota is equal to 50%, provided that
the population of each member state is large enough. Simultaneously, in this
situation, the total voting power of the union measured by the sum of the
Banzhaf indices of all citizens in the union is maximal.
To illustrate the result consider a model union consisting of one large state
with population of 49 millions, three medium states with 16 million each and
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three small with 1 million citizens. For simplicity assume that the double ma-
jority system and the Penrose system are based on the standard majority of
50%. If the polarization of opinion in each state on a given issue is as in the
table below, only 39% of the population of the union is in favor of the legislative.
However, under the rules of the double majority system the decision is taken
(against the will of the vast majority!), what is not the case in the Penrose
system, for which the coalition gains only 10 votes out of 22, so it fails to gather
the required quota.
State A B C D E F G Total
Population [M] 1 1 1 16 16 16 49 100
Votes: Yes [M] 2/3 2/3 2/3 4 4 4 25 39
Votes: No [M] 1/3 1/3 1/3 12 12 12 24 61
State votes 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4/7 Y
Minister’s votes 1 1 1 0 0 0 49 52/100 Y
Square root weights 1 1 1 4 4 4 7 22
Square root votes 1 1 1 0 0 0 7 10/22 N
Table 1. Case study: Voting in the council of a model union of 7 members un-
der a hypothetical distribution of population and voting preferences. Although
61% of the total population of the union is against a legislative it will be taken
by the council, if the rules of the double majority are used. The outcome of the
voting according to the weighted voting system of Penrose correctly reflects the
will of the majority in the union.
To qualitatively understand this result, consider the minister representing
the largest country G with a population of 49 millions. In the double majority
system he uses his 49 votes against the will of 24 millions of inhabitants. By
contrast, the minister of the small state A will misrepresent at most one half
of the million of his compatriots. In other words, the precision in determining
the will of all the citizens is largest in the smaller states, so the vote of their
ministers should gain a higher weight than proportional to population, which is
the case in the Penrose system.
4 Optimal quota for qualified majority
Designing a voting system for the Council one needs to set the threshold for
the qualified majority. In general, this quota can be treated as a free parameter
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of the system and is often considered as a number to be negotiated. For polit-
ical reasons one usually requires that the voting system should be moderately
conservative, so one considers the quota in the wide range from 55% to 75%.
However, designing the voting system based on the theory of Penrose, one
can find a way to obtain a single number as the optimal value of the quota. In
order to assure that the voting powers of all citizens in the ‘union’ are equal
one has to impose the requirement that the voting power of each member state
should be proportional to the square root of the population of each state.
Let us analyze the problem of M members of the voting body, each rep-
resenting a state with population Ni, i = 1, . . . ,M . Denote by wi the voting
weight attributed to each representative. We work with renormalized quantities,
such that
∑M
i=1 wi = 1. Assume that the decision of the voting body is taken,
if the sum of the weights wi of all members of the coalition exceeds the given
quota q.
In the Penrose voting system one sets the voting weights proportional to the
square root of the population of each state, wi ∼
√
Ni for i = 1, . . . ,M . For
any level of the quota q one may compute numerically the power indices βi.
To characterize the overall representativeness of the voting system one may use
various indices designed to quantify the resulting inequality in the distribution
of power among citizens [39]. Analyzing the influence of the quota q for the
average inequality of the voting power we are going to use the mean discrepancy
∆, defined as:
∆ :=
√√√√ 1
M
M∑
i=1
(βi − wi)2 , (8)
If the discrepancy ∆ is equal to zero, the voting power of each state is pro-
portional to the square root of its population. Under the assumption that the
Penrose law is fulfilled, in such a case the voting power of any citizen in each
state is the same.
In practice, the coefficient ∆ will not be exactly equal to zero, but one
may try to minimize this quantity. The optimal quota q∗ can be defined as
the quota for which the discrepancy ∆ is minimal. Let us note, however, that
this definition works fine for the Banzhaf index, while the dependence of the
Shapley–Shubik index [40] on the quota does not exhibit such a minimum.
Studying the problem for a concrete distribution of the population in the
European Union, it was found [29] that in these cases all M ratios βi/wi for
i = 1, . . . ,M , plotted as a function of the quota q, cross approximately near
a single point. In other words, the discrepancy ∆ at this critical point q∗ is
negligible. Numerical analysis allows one to conclude that this optimal quota
is approximately equal to 62.0% for the EU-25 [29]. At this very level of the
quota the voting system can be considered as optimal, since the voting power of
all citizens becomes equal. Performing detailed calculations one needs to care
to approximate the square root function with a sufficient accuracy, since the
rounding effects may play a significant role [41].
It is worth to emphasize that in general the value of the optimal quota
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decreases with the number of member states. For instance, in the case of the EU-
27 is is equal to 61.5% [23, 30], see Table 2. The optimal quota was also found
for other voting bodies including various scenarios for an EU enlargement – see
Leech and Aziz [13]. Note that the above results belong to the range of values
of the quota for qualified majority, which are used in practice or recommended
by experts.
4.1 Large number of member states and a statistical ap-
proximation
Further investigation has confirmed that the existence of such a critical point is
not restricted to the concrete distribution of the population in European Union.
On the contrary, it was reported for a model union containing M states with a
random distribution of population [29, 31, 8]. However, it seems unlikely that
we can obtain an analytical expression for the optimal quota in such a general
case. If the number of member states is large enough one may assume that the
distribution of the sum of the weights is approximately Gaussian [42, 43, 30].
Such an assumption allowed us to derive an explicit approximate formula for
the optimal quota for the Penrose square root voting system [30]
qn :=
1
2

1 +
√∑M
i=1Ni∑M
i=1
√
Ni

 , (9)
where Ni denotes the population of the i–th state. In practice it occurs that
already for M = 25 this approximation works fine and in the case of the EU-
25 gives the optimal quota with an accuracy much better than one percent.
Although the value of the optimal quota changes with M , the efficiency of the
system, measured by the probability of forming the winning coalition, does not
decrease if the union is enlarged. It was shown in [30] that, according to the
central limit theorem, the efficiency of this system tends to approximately 15.9%
if M →∞.
It is not difficult to prove that for any fixed M the above expression attains
its minimum if the population of each member state is the same, Ni = const (i).
In this way one obtains a lower bound for the optimal quota as a function of
the number of states [30]:
qmin :=
1
2
(
1 +
1√
M
)
. (10)
Note that the above bound decreases with the number of the states forming the
union as 1/
√
M to 50%. Such a behavior, reported in numerical analysis of the
problem [29, 31, 8] is consistent with the so-called Penrose limit theorem – see
Lindner and Machover [32].
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4.2 Optimal quota averaged over an ensemble of random
states
Concrete values of the optimal quota obtained by finding numerically the mini-
mum of the discrepancy (8) for the EU-25 and the EU-27 [29, 8, 16] are consis-
tent, with an accuracy up to two per cent, with the data obtained numerically
by averaging over a sample of random distribution of the populations of a fic-
titious union. This observation suggests that one can derive analytically an
approximate formula for the optimal quota by averaging the explicit expression
(9) over an ensemble of random populations Ni.
To perform such a task let us denote by xi the relative population of a
given state, xi = Ni/
∑M
i=1Ni. Since
√
Ni/
√∑M
i=1Ni =
√
xi one can rewrite
expression (9) in the new variables to obtain
qn(
−→x ) = 1
2

1 + 1∑M
i=1
√
Ni/
√∑M
i=1Ni

 = 1
2
(
1 +
1∑M
i=1
√
xi
)
. (11)
By construction, −→x = (x1, . . . , xM ) forms a probability vector with xi ≥ 0
and
∑M
i=1 xi = 1. Hence the entire distribution of the population of the union
is characterized by the M -point probability vector −→x , which lives in an (M −1)
dimensional simplex ∆M . Without any additional knowledge about this vector
we can assume that it is distributed uniformly on the simplex,
PD(x1, . . . , xM ) =
1
(M − 1)! δ
(
1−
M∑
i=1
xi
)
. (12)
Technically it is a particular case of the Dirichlet distribution, written PD(
−→x ),
with the Dirichlet parameter set to unity.
In order to get a concrete result one should then average expression (11)
with the flat probability distribution (12). Result of such a calculation can
be roughly approximated by substituting M -fold mean value over the Dirichlet
measure, M〈√x〉D, instead of the sum into the denominator of the correction
term in (11),
qav(M) := 〈qn〉D ≈ 1
2
(
1 +
1
M〈√x〉D
)
. (13)
The mean square root of a component of the vector −→x is given by an integral
with respect to the Dirichlet distribution
〈√x〉D =
∫
∆M
√
x1 PD(x1, . . . , xM ) dx1 · · · dxM . (14)
Instead of evaluating this integral directly, we shall rely on some simple fact
from the physical literature. It is well known that the distribution of the squared
absolute values of an expansion of a random state in anM -dimensional complex
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Hilbert space is given just by the flat Dirichlet distribution (see e.g. [44]). In
general, all moments of such a distribution where computed by Jones in [45].
The average square root is obtained by taking his expression (26) and setting
d =M , l = 1, ν = 2 and β = 1/2. This gives the required average
〈√x〉D = Γ(M) Γ(3/2)
Γ(M + 1/2)
∼
√
pi
2
√
M
. (15)
Here Γ denotes the Euler gamma function and the last step follows from its
Stirling approximation. Substituting the average 〈√x〉D into (13) we arrive at
a compact expression
qav(M) ≈ 1
2
+
1√
piM
=
1
2
(
1 +
2√
pi
1√
M
)
. (16)
This approximate formula for the mean optimal quota for the Penrose voting
system in a union of M random states constitutes the central result of this
work. Note that this expression is averaged over all possible distributions of
populations in the union, so it depends only on the size M of the union and on
the form of averaging. The formula has a similar structure as the lower bound
(10), but the correction term is enhanced by the factor 2/
√
pi ≈ 1.128. In some
analogy to the famous Buffon’s needle (or noodle) problem [46], the final result
contains the number pi – it appears in (16) as a consequence of using the normal
approximation. The key advantage of the result (16) is due to its simplicity.
Therefore, it can be useful in a practical case, if the size M of the voting body
is fixed, but the weights of the voters (e.g. the populations in the EU) vary.
M 25 27 28 29 ... M →∞
qn[%] 62.16 61.58 61.38 61.32 ... 50.0
qav[%] 61.28 60.86 60.66 60.48 ... 50.0
qmin[%] 60.00 59.62 59.45 59.28 ... 50.0
Table 2. Optimal quota qn for the Council of the European Union of M
member states compared with predictions qav of the approximate formula (16)
and the lower bound qmin given in (10). The calculations of the optimal quotas
for the EU were based upon the Eurostat data on the distribution of population
for the EU–25 (2004) and the EU–27 (2010). The extended variant EU-28
contains EU-27 and Croatia, while EU-29 includes also Iceland.
5 Concluding remarks
In this work we review various arguments leading to the weighted voting system
based upon the square root law of Penrose. However, the key result consists in
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an approximate formula for the mean optimal threshold of the qualified majority.
It depends only on the number M of the states in the union, since the actual
distribution of the population is averaged out.
Making use of this result we are in a position to propose a simplified voting
system. The system consists of a single criterion only and is determined by the
following two rules:
(1) Each member of the voting body of sizeM is attributed his voting weight
proportional to the square root of the population he represents.
(2) The decision of the voting body is taken if the sum of the weights of
members of a coalition exceeds the critical quota q = 1/2 + 1/
√
piM .
This voting system is based on a single criterion. Furthermore, the quota
depends on the number of players only, but not on the particular distribution of
weights of the individual players. This feature can be considered as an advantage
in a realistic case, if the distribution of the population changes in time. The
system proposed is objective and it cannot a priori handicap a given member
of the voting body. The quota for qualified majority is considerably larger than
50% for any size of the voting body of a practical interest. Thus the voting
system is moderately conservative, as it should be. If the distribution of the
population is known and one may assume that it is invariant in time, one may
use a modified rule (2’) and set the optimal quota according to the more precise
formula (9).
Furthermore, the system is transparent: the voting power of each member
of the voting body is up to a high accuracy proportional to his voting weight.
However, as a crucial advantage of the proposed voting system we would like
to emphasize its extendibility: if the size M of the voting body changes, all one
needs to do is to set the voting weights according to the square root law and
adjust the quota q according to the rule (2). Moreover, for a fixed number of
players, the system does not depend on the particular distribution of weights.
This feature is specially relevant for voting bodies in corporate management for
which the voting weights may vary frequently.
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